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Abstract 
Earnings management research has a long and rich history. The agency conflict, incentives, rationalization, opportunity plus 
having the capability among the managers to manipulate the financial statement lead them to commit fraud. The loopholes in the 
standards or the deviation from real operational activities promote this situation to prolong. According to the agency theory, 
separation of ownership and control gives rise to manager’s incentives to select and apply accounting estimates and techniques 
that can increase their own wealth. This issue has become more important in recent years as more firms are listed on stock 
exchanges as public firms. In this review, we emphasize studies that advance the managerial understanding of the earnings 
management and agency theory. This paper aims at reviewing on some major conducted research from various countries, 
examining relationships between ownership structure (and its subsets) and earnings management. The results of the paper further 
extend the literatures in understanding the determination of the influences of ownership structure and earnings management. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Peer-review under responsibility of Universiti Teknologi MARA Johor. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In a world characterised by imperfect information and costly monitoring, a divergence of interests between 
shareholders and management can lead to suboptimal management decisions. Such decisions are possible because 
the actions of managers are largely unobservable and the goals of the managers and their shareholders are not 
necessarily aligned. Managers are posited to opportunistically manage earnings to maximise their utility at the 
expense of other stakeholders. Agency theory suggests that the monitoring mechanisms can improve the alignment 
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of management and shareholders’ interests and mitigate any opportunistic behaviour resulting from conflict of 
interests. 
The agency problem between shareholders and managers, raised by Berle and Gardiner (1968), as a result of 
dispersed shareholders in large enterprises; arises when the contributors of the funds need to finance investment, 
while assuming the risk of acquiring business and ownership of the company, and they are forced to entrust 
supervision and direction to someone who possesses the qualifications and skills needed to perform this function. If 
the shareholders have complete information on investment opportunities, presented to the organization and company 
managers, they could design complete contracts that did not give full scope for the discretion of the board of 
directors. But this is not true and the actions of management and investment opportunities are not perfectly 
observable by the owners, as a result, managers can engage in an opposite conduct to the owners’ interests’. In other 
words, managers have incentives to expropriate the company´s profits, through projects that benefit them but may 
have adversely impacted shareholders (Fama, 1980; Jensen & Meckling, 1979). 
A conflict of interests has potential agency cost such as management decisions that do not maximize 
shareholder’s interests. Managers may manage reported earnings to justify their actions. Earnings management may 
lead to an agency cost where investors make non-optimal investment decisions from reported earnings. In a situation 
where a company has a high free cash flow, the manager may be engaged in earnings management to show better 
performance of the company. This relation can be explained by using agency theory. In this contractual context, 
characterized by the conflict of interests between shareholders and managers, corporate governance involves the 
design series mechanisms that reconcile the interests of shareholders and managers (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Hart, 
1995; Myers, 1977), thus avoiding the management that seeks to maximize his or her utility function even at the 
expense of shareholder’s wealth. There is, in turn, a relationship between fund sources and investment, that holds 
both when firms face positive NPV opportunities and when they do not. 
A clear relationship between ownership structure and managers´ discretionary accruals can be seen, being the 
measure of earnings management, an important and continuing debate in the literature on corporate governance. 
However, a growing body of literature has shown how the relation between earnings management and financial 
decisions is strongly conditional on the growth opportunities open to the firm (Bukit & Iskandar, 2009; Chen & Liu, 
2010; Lang, Ofek, & Stulz, 1996; McConnell & Servaes, 1995; Smith & Watts, 1992). But much less is known 
about how this relationship is influenced by ownership structure, particularly family ownership. This is an important 
issue because a new conflict of interests can arise between majority controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders, since the fundamental agency problem for listed companies in emerging markets is not a conflict of 
interest between outside investors and managers as argued by Berle and Means (1932), but a conflict of interest 
between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
Moreover, accounting earnings is considered as one of the main indicators of financial performance of a firm. 
Naturally, the phenomenon of earnings management has already drawn the attention of academic researchers, 
financial markets regulators, operators and investors. 
Previous studies have focused mainly on the incentives of earnings management. The most important incentives 
investigated in prior literature include: compensation contracts (Cohen, Dey, & Lys, 2008; Guidry, Leone, & Rock, 
1999; Healy, 1985; Holthausen, Larcker, & Sloan, 1995), reduce political costs (Key, 1997; Patten & Trompeter, 
2003), signal manager’s private information (Louis & White, 2007), avoid losses (Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997; 
Burgstahler & Eames, 2003), meet analysts’ forecasts (Burgstahler & Eames, 2006; Dhaliwal, Gleason, & Mills, 
2004), avoid debt covenant violations (Jaggi & Lee, 2002), initial public offerings (Ball & Shivakumar, 2008; 
Roosenboom, van der Goot, & Mertens, 2003), and stock-financed acquisitions (Erickson & Wang, 1999; Savor & 
Lu, 2009). 
However, a variety of factors do exist which limit earnings management. In fact, some studies have indicated that 
certain corporate governance factors have an impact on corporate accounting behaviour, including earnings 
management (Bushman, Chen, Engel, & Smith, 2004; Cornett, Marcus, & Tehranian, 2008; Dechow, Sloan, & 
Sweeney, 1996). For example, Warfield, Wild, and Wild (1995) argue that managers who own a significant portion 
in the equity of a firm have less incentive to manipulate reported accounting information. Dechow et al. (1996) 
suggest that large block-holders of shares improve credibility of a firm’s financial statements by providing close 
scrutiny over its earnings management activity. Balsam, Bartov, and Marquardt (2002) state that institutional 
investors, who are sophisticated investors, are more capable of detecting earnings management that non-institutional 
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investors because they have more access to timely and relevant information. Chung, Firth, and Kim (2002) find that 
the institutional shareholdings inhibit managers from managing accruals to achieve desired level of earnings. These 
studies suggest that a firm’s ownership structure have a significant impact on the magnitude of earnings management 
and earnings quality. 
This review essay evaluates some major recent studies in this rapidly growing field, from several different 
countries. In order to achieve this goal, the paper is structured as follows. It starts with an introduction. In the next 
section we provide an overview of the literature review about the relationship between agency theory and earnings 
management. An in-depth discussion about the relationship between institutional ownership and the agency theory is 
presented in section 3. Then, we consider the main discussion about the relationship between ownership structure 
and earnings management through reviewing and analyzing the previous body of literature in the fourth section. 
Conclusion of this study is discussed in section 5. 
2.  AGENCY THEORY AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
The debate about the impact of governance mechanisms on earnings management should be placed in the 
context of the agency problem arising from the ownership and control separation, creating interests asymmetries 
between managers and shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1979). When managers do not own the company, their 
behavior is affected by self-interest that put off their goals of maximizing company value and, consequently, the 
interests of the shareholders or owners (Ali, Salleh, & Hassan, 2010; Chen & Liu, 2010; Eldenburg, Gunny, Hee, & 
Soderstrom, 2011; Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
Consequently, agency theory suggests that a separation between ownership and control, leads to a divergence 
between manager and owner interests (Jensen & Meckling, 1979). Conflicts of interest among principles 
(shareholders) and agents (managers) frequently happen. The agency problem becomes more evident on both the 
managers and shareholders, because the presumption is that managers will not act in the best interest of the 
shareholders (Bukit & Iskandar, 2009). Thus, monitoring managerial decisions becomes essential to assure that 
shareholders’ interests are protected (Fama & Jensen, 1983). In this sense, the separation between ownership and 
control is the main problem as to avoid possible opportunistic behavior of managers that tend to reduce the firm 
value. In this respect, the literature on corporate governance emphasizes the mechanisms available to protect 
investors’ rights (Chung et al., 2002; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
A usual classification scheme makes a difference between external and internal control mechanisms. Whereas 
the market for corporate control is widely known as being the most outstanding external mechanism, there is a 
number of possible internal mechanisms such as capital, ownership structure and board which have been proved to 
discipline firm managers (Reyna, 2012). 
3.  INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP AND AGENCY THEORY 
Agency theory suggests that monitoring by institutional ownership can be an important governance mechanism 
(the efficient monitoring hypothesis). In fact, institutional investors can provide active monitoring that is difficult for 
smaller, more passive or less-informed investors (Almazan, Hartzell, & Starks, 2005). Additionally, institutional 
investors have the opportunity, resources, and ability to monitor managers. Therefore, the efficient monitoring 
suggest that institutional ownership is associated with a better monitoring of management activities, reducing the 
ability of managers to opportunistically manipulate earnings. The efficient monitoring hypothesis suggests an 
inverse relationship between a firm’s earnings management activity and its institutional share ownership. In this 
vein, several studies document that institutional ownership inhibits managers to opportunistically engage in earnings 
management (Bange & De Bondt, 1998; Bushee, 1998; Chung et al., 2002; Cornett et al., 2008; Ebrahim, 2007; 
Koh, 2003). 
However, some argue that institutional investors do not play an active role in monitoring management activities 
(Claessens & Fan, 2002; Porter, 1992). According to Duggal and Millar (1999, p. 106), ‘institutional investors are 
passive investors who are more likely to sell their holdings in poorly performing firms than to expend their resources 
in monitoring and improving their performance’. Institutional investors may be incapable of exerting their 
monitoring role and vote against managers because it may affect their business relationships with the firm. 
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Accordingly, institutional investors may collude with management (Pound, 1988; Sundaramurthy, Rhoades, & 
Rechner, 2005). It is also argued that institutional owners are overly focused on short-term financial results, and as 
such, they are unable to monitor management (Bushee, 1998; Porter, 1992). So, there will be a pressure on 
management to meet short-term earnings expectations. These arguments indicate that institutional investors may not 
limit managers’ earnings management discretion and may increase managerial incentives to engage in earnings 
management (passive hands-off hypothesis). 
4. EARNINGS MANAGEMENT AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES 
As discussed above the issue of misreporting financial data and earnings management has become more 
nourished in recent years. Several studies have been conducted determining influences of institutional ownership 
structure and earnings management in various countries. This section reviews and analyses some major conducted 
research.  
Reyna (2012) investigated the influence of ownership structure, board and leverage on the earnings management 
when companies either face, or do not face, profitable growth opportunities for a sample of 90 listed Mexican firms 
during the period 2005-2009. This study examined if in the presence of growth opportunities, the control 
mechanisms implemented by the shareholders continue operating in the same way when the manager has options to 
invest in projects using available cash flows (growth opportunity), or, whether control mechanisms operate 
differently when the manager does not have an option to invest (absence of growth opportunities). This theoretical 
framework has been applied to a sample of large Mexican firms publicly traded in capital markets for the 2005–
2009 periods, examining if control mechanisms implemented by the shareholders operate differently on earnings 
management with the presence or absence of growth opportunities. According to this research, the issue of ultimate 
controlling shareholders is bolded in Mexico, because managers of Mexican corporations are usually related to the 
family of the controlling shareholder. They document that Mexican companies present a higher ownership 
concentration and many firms are directly or indirectly controlled by one of the numerous industrial conglomerates. 
A conglomerate is a group of firms linked to each other through ownership relations and controlled by a local family 
or a group of investors. Usually, conglomerates are controlled by the dominant shareholders through relatively 
complex structures including the use of pyramids, cross-holdings and dual class shares.  
The results show that ownership structure, leverage and board of directors affect earnings management as well as 
the type of influence depends on the presence or absence of investment opportunities. Family ownership, 
composition and size of board and leverage play a dual role: reduce the earnings management when there are no 
investments projects, but impact positively with the presence of growth opportunities. In other words, when there 
are no growths opportunities, governance mechanisms (ownership, board and debt) play an important role in 
reducing the interest conflict mentioned above since undertaking unprofitable projects or perquisite consumption 
might exacerbate these agency problems. However, a problem of wealth expropriation is arising between majority 
and minority shareholders in firms with mayor growth opportunities. Ownership concentration, debt and board of 
directors act as disciplinary mechanisms only in firms with absence of growth opportunities because firms with 
more investment opportunities and greater access to positive net present value projects are more difficult to observe 
and monitor. As a result of this lower observability of managers’ activities and higher probability for managers’ 
opportunistic behavior, growth firms will be more risky than their non-growth counterparts. Moreover, controls in 
high-growth firms are less likely to be effective, given the control system that has been installed may keep pace only 
with the original scale of operations. 
To sum up, the study confirms the relationship between control mechanism, earnings management and growth 
opportunities.  
However, Alves (2012) who has examined the relationship between corporate ownership structure in Portugal 
and earnings management, got partly different results from Reyna (2012). This research aimed to analyse whether a 
firm’s ownership structure (measured with three variables: managerial ownership, ownership concentration and 
institutional ownership) exacerbate or alleviate earnings management. Using a sample of 34 Euronext Lisbon non-
financial firms over a period of 6 years, from 2002 through 2007 (204 firm-year observations). The study found that 
discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings management is negatively related both to managerial ownership and to 
ownership concentration. Specifically, the results of this study show that both managerial ownership and ownership 
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concentration inhibit earnings management. This result is consistent with both the alignment of interest hypothesis, 
which suggests that managers who own a significant portion of the equity in a firm have less incentive to manipulate 
reported accounting information, and the efficient monitoring hypothesis, which suggests that large shareholders 
reduce the scope of managerial opportunism. 
Moreover, the results also reveal that there is less earnings management when operating cash flows are high and 
that there is more earnings management when political costs, leverage and board size are high. In sum, the findings 
highlight the importance of ownership structure, mainly managerial ownership and ownership concentration, in 
constraining the likelihood of earnings management in Portugal. Therefore, this study indicates that both managerial 
ownership and ownership concentration affect the informational quality of earnings positively, and consequently 
enhance the quality and value relevance of published financial data. 
In another major study, Al-Fayoumi, Abuzayed, and Alexander (2010) reported that insider ownership is 
significant and positively affect earnings management. This research determined the relationship between earnings 
management and ownership structure for a sample of Jordanian industrial firms. The sample used in this study 
comprises the 39 listed industrial firms’ analysis, which represents around 64% of Jordanian Industrial firms, in 
Amman stock exchange between 2001 and 2005. In this study earnings management is measured by discretionary 
accruals. The three types of ownership studied are; insiders, institutions and block-holders. This study used the 
Generalized Method of Moment (GMM). 
The results of the current research can be categorized into two parts. The first part confirms that there is a 
positive and significant relationship between insiders' ownership and earnings management. It means, greater 
ownership would provide managers with deeper entrenchment and, therefore, greater scope for opportunistic 
behavior. This finding indicates that Jordanian insiders tend to make discretionary accounting choices. The second 
part of the findings indicates that neither institutions nor block-holders have significant influences on earnings 
management. These results suggest that institutions and block-holders generally play a myopic role in Jordanian 
companies. They do not monitor effectively because they may either lack expertise or suffer from free rider 
problems among themselves, or strategically ally with the management.  
The challenges due the agency issues and earnings management have become more critical in Malaysia during 
recent years, as well. A recent study by Ali et al. (2010) examined the association between the level of managerial 
ownership and earnings management activities, represented by the magnitude of discretionary accounting accruals in 
Malaysian listed firms. This study argues that size may be one of the significant reasons that may affect the 
managerial ownership and agency conflict relationship. Therefore, the objective of this study is to investigate the 
role of firm size in the relationship between managerial ownership and earnings management practices. Specifically, 
this study addresses the question of whether the relationship between managerial ownership and earnings 
management is different according to firm size. Secondary data is obtained from annual reports of firms listed on 
Bursa Malaysia for the years ending 2002 and 2003. Firms from the finance industry and unit trusts are excluded 
from this study as they are subject to some unique regulations and the accruals behaviour is different compared to 
other firms. In total 1,001 public listed firms were chosen.  
Results of this study indicate that the size of the firm is a ‘quasi’ moderating variable where the negative and 
significant relationship between the level of management ownership and discretionary accruals is weakened by a 
positive and significant relationship between the interaction between size of the firm and executive ownership and 
discretionary accruals. This indicates that although management ownership may reduce the earnings management 
activities, other factors such as firm size may also affect the behaviour. Managerial ownership is found to be an 
effective monitoring mechanism, particularly in small firms. This result suggests that managerial ownership should 
be encouraged in small firms so that it can be the substitute for the weakness of other corporate governance 
mechanisms. This study also indicates that other types of ownership play an important role in monitoring firms’ 
activities. 
In sum, the results show that managerial ownership is negatively associated with the magnitude of accounting 
accruals. However, this study finds that managerial ownership is less important in large-sized firms compared to 
small-sized firms. This finding suggests that large-sized firms demand and use better corporate governance 
mechanisms due to higher agency conflicts, and, therefore, less managerial ownership is needed for control. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
This paper aims to review some major studies from previous body of literature in the fields of influences of 
institutional ownership on the agency conflicts and its consequences accrued for firms in different countries. In this 
regard, initially, two in-depth discussions were presented to clarify relationships between the agency theory and 
earnings management as well as institutional ownership structure using previous valuable conducted research. Many 
studies were reviewed within these two sections about these components.  
Then, several studies with almost the same objective, which was determination of the relationship between 
ownership structure and earnings management accrued in firms were reviewed and analysed from different 
countries.  
However, the sample size and country of each of the studies was different, but the findings of all of them were 
almost the same. More or less, all the research have found a significant relationship between ownership structure of 
the firms and accruing earnings management. This findings show that earnings management is influenced by the 
firms’ ownership structure, regardless to the environmental circumstances. 
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